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We introduce a new multiparty cryptographic protocol, which we call ‘entanglement sharing
schemes’, wherein a dealer retains half of a maximally-entangled bipartite state and encodes the
other half into a multipartite state that is distributed among multiple players. In a close ana-
logue to quantum secret sharing, some subsets of players can recover maximal entanglement with
the dealer whereas other subsets can recover no entanglement (though they may retain classical
correlations with the dealer). We find a lower bound on the share size for such schemes and con-
struct two non-trivial examples based on Shor’s [[9, 1, 3]] and the [[4, 2, 2]] stabilizer code; we further
demonstrate how other examples may be obtained from quantum error correcting codes through
classical encryption. Finally, we demonstrate that entanglement sharing schemes can be applied to
characterize leaked information in quantum ramp secret sharing.
PACS numbers: 03.67. Pp,03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Mn
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing is a well-studied multi-party crypto-
graphic protocol in the classical regime [1, 2] and the
quantum regime, which can correspond to either shar-
ing classical messages via quantum channels [3] or shar-
ing arbitrary quantum states [4] known as CQ and QQ
versions, respectively [5]; we focus on QQ secret shar-
ing here. Multi-party cryptographic protocols typically
are described as involving one party (the dealer) possess-
ing some information (the secret) which they distribute
among the other parties (the players) in such a way that
some subsets of players can completely recover the secret,
whereas other subsets of players are denied any knowl-
edge of the secret. Secret sharing has numerous applica-
tions in cryptography including secure multi-party com-
putation, effecting the Byzantine agreement. threshold
cryptography, access control, and generalized oblivious
transfer [6]. In the quantum regime, where the secret
can be quantum information, quantum secret sharing
(QSS) could be applied to quantum generalizations of
applications for secret sharing, such as distributed quan-
tum computation [7] or authorizing one party to access
encrypted quantum communication.
Here we develop a theory of entanglement sharing
schemes (ESS), which is based on QSS including one
dealer and multiple players, but we are concerned not
with recovery of classical or quantum information but
rather with recovering shared entanglement between the
dealer and the players. This secure protocol for shar-
ing entanglement is important as entanglement is a valu-
able communication resource when only classical or de-
graded quantum channels are available between dealer
and players after the initial sharing stage. Entanglement
is a crucial consumable resource for quantum communica-
tion tasks such as quantum teleportation [8], super-dense
coding [9] and device-independent quantum key distribu-
tion [10, 11].
In entanglement sharing, the dealer, rather than en-
coding an arbitrary quantum state as in QSS, encodes
half of a bipartite maximally-entangled state (MES),
which is then distributed to multiple players. This dis-
tribution meets the requirement that the entanglement
can be perfectly recovered between the dealer and certain
“authorized” subsets of players (the resultant shared en-
tanglement being then usable as a resource). Futhermore
no entanglement can be obtained between the dealer and
other “unauthorized” subsets of players. The “access
structure” is the collection of all authorized subsets, and
the “adversary structure” is the collection of all unau-
thorized subsets.
The ESS, QSS and quantum error correcting coding
(QECC) are interrelated as we shall discover in this pa-
per. Any QSS scheme can be modified to serve as an
ESS, and all ESSs can be derived from quantum error
correcting codes. In symbolic language we can write
QSS. Moreover quantum ramp secret sharing protocols
(QRSSs) contain ESSs and are contained in protocols
corresponding to quantum error correcting codes. Sym-
bolically we can write
Q˜SS ⊂ ESS ⊂ Q˜RSS ⊂ Q˜ECC
for the ˜ symbol denoting that the indicated scheme is
actually its adaptation to ESS.
Entanglement sharing can be implemented using any
QSS scheme: the dealer simply chooses the shared infor-
mation to be half of an MES and proceeds as normal; the
requirement for unauthorized subsets of the QSS scheme
to have no information about the secret will ensure no
shared entanglement with the dealer. However, as we
find, the differing requirements for ESSs (in particular
the ability for unauthorized subsets to share classical cor-
relations with the dealer) allow for distinct schemes to
be constructed. We present examples of such schemes in
later sections, and discuss how the use of classical encryp-
tion allows them to be constructed from error-correcting
codes which may not naturally allow for such schemes.
2Finally we discuss the conceptual use of ESSs in
the context of sharing arbitrary quantum states at a
lower cost. In QSS possessing perfect secrecy against
information leakage, the size of shares allocated to each
player must be at as large as the size of the secret [4, 12].
This limitation on the size of shares can impose large
communication and storage costs. QRSS is cheaper in
the size of shares than quantum secret sharing, but it
leaks some information to unauthorized sets of players,
which are denoted as intermediate sets [13]. As the
information leakage can compromise the secrecy of
protocols, it is important to characterize the leaked
information and prevent the intermediate structure from
learning any valuable information.
II. ENTANGLEMENT SHARING SCHEMES
Our general form of an ESS is as follows: suppose that
a dealer D initially prepares a quantum system in an MES
|S〉. She retains half of the system, and encodes the other
half into the shares of n players P = {P1,P2, . . . ,Pn}.
Every subset of players must be either an authorized set
or an unauthorized set. We denote as the recoverability
condition that any authorized set of players can recon-
struct |S〉 fully using local operations (with respect to
the player/dealer divide; they may perform joint quan-
tum operations within their subset), and as the secrecy
condition that any unauthorized set cannot share any en-
tanglement with the dealer.
We note that in this scheme every access structure is
monotone i.e. any set of shares including an authorized
set is also authorized. Also the complement of any au-
thorized set must be unauthorized, due to monogamy of
entanglement [14, 15], which states that if two systems
are maximally entangled they cannot be entangled with
any third system. This can be expressed, for example,
via the inequality
E(ρXY ) + E(ρXZ) ≤ E(ρX(Y Z)) (1)
for any composite system of X , Y and Z. This inequal-
ity holds for some entanglement measures such as the
one-way distillable entanglement and the squashed en-
tanglement [16, 17].
Let X be the dealer, Y be an authorized set and Z be
the complement of Y . As ρXY can be transformed into
ρX(Y Z) by LOCC (local operations and classical commu-
nication) with respect to the dealer/player divide, and
vice versa, ρXY must have the same amount of entangle-
ment with respect to this divide as ρX(Y Z). Therefore,
the complement of any authorized set is an unauthorized
set, i.e., E(ρXZ) = 0. It similarly follows that, due to
the monogamy of entanglement, an access structure in
an ESS cannot have two disjoint subsets, since both such
subsets could simultaneously recover maximal entangle-
ment with the dealer. This is analogous to quantum se-
cret sharing not allowing an access structure to have two
disjoint subsets due to the no-cloning theorem.
A. Properties
We derive the upper bound of the recoverable entan-
glement using the non-lockability of the relative entropy
of entanglement [18, 19] to obtain Theorem 1. Let the
share of a player r be an “important” share if there is an
unauthorized set T such that A = T ∪ {r} is authorized.
Theorem 1. Every ESS satisfies
ER(ρ
DP) ≤ 2q (2)
where ER is the relative entropy of entanglement, ρ
DP is
any state shared between a dealer D and a set of play-
ers P, and q is the size of the smallest important share
(i.e. q is the number of qubits in that share).
Proof. Let Γ be an unauthorized set satisfying A = Γ ∪
{u} where A is an authorized set and {u} /∈ Γ is the
player who possesses the smallest important share, and
let ρDΓu be the reduced density matrix of joint system
of A and the dealer. Assume that the total dephasing
(i.e., twirling) is performed on the smallest important
share. That is, the unitary operators gui ∈ {I,X, Y, Z}⊗q
are applied to u with equal probabilities. Then relative
entropy of entanglement ER satisfies
∑
i
piER(ρi)−ER
(∑
i
piρi
)
≤ S
(∑
i
piρi
)
−
∑
i
piS(ρi) (3)
with
ρi = (1
DΓ ⊗ gui )ρDΓu(1DΓ ⊗ gui ) (4)
and pi =
1
4q . Due to total dephasing, we have∑
i
piρi = tru(ρ
DΓu)⊗ 1
2k
1
u. (5)
Hence, the player u does not now contribute to the en-
tanglement with the dealer because it is independent of
the other players and the dealer. Thus,
ER
(∑
i
piρi
)
= ER(tru(ρ
DΓu)). (6)
As the relative entropy of entanglement is invariant
under local unitary transformations, we also have∑
i
piER(ρi) =
∑
i
piER(ρ
DΓu) = ER(ρ
DΓu). (7)
3Using the above equations we can rewrite (3) as
ER(ρ
DΓu)−ER(tru(ρDΓu))
≤ S(
∑
i
piρi)−
∑
i
piS(ρi)
≤ H(pi) = 2q. (8)
As Γ is an unauthorized set, its reduced density ma-
trix tru(ρ
DΓu) is not entangled with the dealer; i.e.,
ER(tru(ρ
DΓu)) = 0. On the other hand, ρDΓu has the
same amount of entanglement as ρDP because ρDΓu can
be transformed into ρDP by LOCC and vice versa. There-
fore, we have ER(ρ
DP) = ER(ρ
DΓu).
Let a player r possess a one-qubit important share,
where T is an unauthorized set and A = T ∪ {r} is au-
thorized. As the set A can recover the entangled state
ρDP initially shared between a dealer D and a set of play-
ers P, the state ρDA has the same amount of entanglement
as ρDP, but the amount of entanglement must go to zero
by discarding the share r. According to [18], the amount
of entanglement can decrease at most by two upon dis-
carding one qubit with respect to the relative entropy of
entanglement.
Any bipartite entanglement measure has the same
value for an MES [19]. Therefore, if a dealer D shares an
MES with a set of players P, we have E(ρDP) = ER(ρ
DP).
This leads to the following corollary to Theorem 1.
Corollary 2. For any entanglement measure E,
E(ρDP) ≤ 2q (9)
where ρDP is an initial MES and q is the size of the
smallest important share.
We note here a distinct difference between an ESS and
a QSS, despite the close analogies of the two processes;
in QSS the size of the secret can be no larger than that
of the smallest share [12], whereas in an ESS (for which
we find protocols that saturate this bound) one can share
twice as much entanglement as the size of the smallest
share.
Just as in QSS, a natural starting point for construct-
ing an ESS is to use an existing QECC, as the recovery
operation in an ESS is a form of correction of erasure er-
rors (the missing shares of the players which are not part
of the subset performing the recovery). Thus, a given
QECC naturally satisfies the necessary recovery condi-
tion for some ESS. However, the secrecy condition for an
ESS may be violated if the code space yields unautho-
rized sets that share partially entangled states (i.e., nei-
ther maximally entangled nor separable) with the dealer.
As [[n, k, d]] stabilizer codes are simple well-understood
codes, we focus on using such codes as the basis for seek-
ing ESSs. A dealer encodes a MES
|Sℓ〉 := 1√
ℓ
ℓ−1∑
j=0
|j〉|j〉 (10)
via the mapping
|S2k〉 7→ |Ψ〉 =
1√
2k
2k−1∑
j=0
|j〉|Cj〉 (11)
where the code space C of the [[n, k, d]] stabilizer code
is spanned by {|Cj〉}j=0···2k−1 with each Cj a codeword
of C. Each qubit of the code is taken as a share (i.e.,
C = HP1 ⊗ HP2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ HPn where HPi is the Hilbert
space of the ith share).
In this scheme, an access structure is determined from
the stabilizer S of the stabilizer code. Such a code can
detect all errors E that are either in S or anti-commute
with any element of S [20]. If the stabilizer code can cor-
rect erasure errors on the setK of shares, the complement
ofK would be an authorized set that can reconstruct |Sℓ〉
through the recovery operation of the code. In this way
we can determine an access structure as well as an ad-
versary structure.
In order to satisfy the secrecy condition of ESSs, we
require that the reduced density matrix of every unau-
thorized set is separable with the dealer, which will not
automatically be the case for a given QECC. We find, for
example, that ESSs can be constructed from Shor’s nine-
qubit code [21] (i.e., a [[9, 1, 3]] stabilizer code) and from
a [[4, 2, 2]] stabilizer code [20]. In both these schemes
the reduced density matrix of every unauthorized set is
straightforward to write in a separable form with the
dealer. In general determining whether or not a bipartite
density matrix is entangled is NP-Hard [22] so verifying
the secrecy of an ESS is typically hard.
B. Entanglement sharing using the [[4,2,2]] code
We now give an explicit example of an ESS. As shown
below, the [[4,2,2]] stabilizer code leads to a threshold
ESS (i.e., a scheme in which the access structure is de-
termined solely by the number of players in each subset)
due to the permutation invariance of the elements of its
stabilizer. Moreover, this scheme saturates the bound of
Eq. (2) as the size of shares is half of the size of initial
entanglement.
We consider the case that a dealer D holds half of
|S4〉 and encodes the other half into four shares P =
{1, 2, 3, 4} according to
|S4〉 → |Ψ〉 = 1
2
3∑
j=0
|j〉D|βj〉12|βj〉34 (12)
with
|β0〉 = |00〉+ |11〉√
2
, |β1〉 = |00〉 − |11〉√
2
,
|β2〉 = |01〉+ |10〉√
2
, |β3〉 = |01〉 − |10〉√
2
, (13)
4the set of Bell states, where D denotes the dealer’s qubit
and the index of |β〉xy refers to the xth and yth shares.
As the stabilizer code can correct any single erasure er-
ror, |S4〉 can be recovered from any three or more shares.
Thus, any single share cannot be entangled with the
dealer, and we can show explicitly that any single share
is in a product state with the dealer, of the form
1
4
∑
j
|j〉D〈j| ⊗ 1
2
1x (14)
with 1x the identity matrix of a single share x.
The subsets {1, 2} and {3, 4} each have a separable
state with the dealer as is clear from Eq. (12). The fol-
lowing analysis shows that all other sets of two shares
are also separable with the dealer. Note that, as found
in [23], the indices of qubits in the state |βj〉12|βj〉34 can
be re-ordered as
|βj〉12|βj〉34 =
∑
k
cjk|βk〉pq|βk〉rs (15)
where {p, q, r, s} is a permutation of P = {1, 2, 3, 4}. By
tracing out two arbitrary players {p, q}, one obtains the
separable state
trpq
(
|Ψ〉〈Ψ|
)
=
1
4
∑
k
(∑
j,j′
cjkcj′k|j〉D〈j′|
)
⊗ |βk〉rs〈βk|
=
1
4
∑
k
|ak〉D〈ak| ⊗ |βk〉rs〈βk| (16)
where |ak〉 =
∑
j cjk|j〉D.
C. Entanglement sharing using Shor’s code
An ESS with a general (not threshold) access structure
can be constructed from Shor’s nine-qubit code. In this
scheme, half of |S2〉 is encoded into nine shares P =
{1, 2, 3, . . . , 9} of 1 qubit, producing the joint state of
dealer and players of
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
1∑
j=0
|j〉D|Gj〉123|Gj〉456|Gj〉789. (17)
with
|G0〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉) (18)
and
|G1〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉). (19)
We note that the encoding is not fully symmetric be-
tween shares, but divides the players into three “triplets”
{{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5, 6}, {7, 8, 9}}.
The nine-qubit Shor code [21] can correct erasure er-
rors on any of those subsets K ⊆ P which consist of
1. any one or two qubits,
2. two qubits in one triplet and a single qubit in an-
other triplet (e.g., {1, 2, 4}), or
3. two qubits in one triplet and two qubits in another
triplet (e.g., {1, 2, 4, 5}).
Therefore, the complement of K can recover |S2〉 using
error correction for the 9-qubit code, and K cannot be
entangled with the dealer due to monogamy.
The remaining subsets of players {B}, consisting nei-
ther of subsets K nor their complements, are separable
with the dealer. For example, the reduced density matrix
of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} can be written as
tr789
(
|Ψ〉〈Ψ|
)
=
1
2
1∑
j=0
|j〉〈j|D ⊗ |Gj〉123〈Gj | ⊗ |Gj〉456〈Gj |. (20)
In a similar way the other subsets in {B} are also
separable with the dealer, as shown in the Appendix .
D. Non-perfect entanglement sharing
As shown below, not all stabilizer codes satisfy the se-
crecy condition for standard entanglement sharing, al-
though we can also consider them as a “non-perfect”
case, in which we allow some partial entanglement be-
tween unauthorized subsets and the dealer. For example,
a [[6,4,2]] stabilizer code [20] yields a non-perfect ESS.
Suppose that a dealer encodes an MES of four ebits by
the [[6, 4, 2]] code such that
1
4
16∑
i=1
|i〉|i〉 7→ 1
4
16∑
i=1
|i〉|βf(i)〉|βg(i)〉|βf(i)+g(i)〉 (21)
where f(i), g(i) = {0, 1, 2, 3} and {|βj〉} are the Bell
states.
Any five players can recover the original entanglement
as this stabilizer code can correct erasure errors on
a single qubit. However, any four players have some
entanglement with the dealer even though they are an
unauthorized set, as can be seen in two ways. First the
reduced density matrix of four players violates the posi-
tive partial transpose criterion [24, 25], which provides
one useful way to check state separability in ESSs when
separability is not obvious from the density matrices.
Second, the amount of initially shared entanglement is
too large to satisfy Theorem 1 (i.e., ER(ρ
DP) = 4 and
q = 1). Therefore, some entanglement must remain even
after one player is excluded from an authorized set.
5III. HYBRID ENTANGLEMENT SHARING
A QECC that does not already satisfy the secrecy
condition can potentially be made to do so through hy-
bridization with classical information. Similarly to hy-
brid QSS [7, 26], hybrid ESSs can be implemented from
any QECC combined with classical secret sharing, by
“locking” any leaked entanglement from recovery by first
encrypting the dealer’s MES using classical keys (i.e., bit
strings) and then distributing the keys among a set of
players in such a way that unauthorized sets are totally
denied any access to entanglement.
The principle of encrypting quantum information with
classical keys is shown in quantum teleportation [8]. Al-
ice generates two classical bits by performing a joint mea-
surement on a quantum state |ψ〉 that she intends to tele-
port to Bob and half of a previously shared MES. In the
absence of Alice’s classical bits, Bob’s qubit is left in a
maximally mixed state,
1
4
(|ψ〉〈ψ|+X |ψ〉〈ψ|X+Z|ψ〉〈ψ|Z+XZ|ψ〉〈ψ|ZX). (22)
However, with the knowledge of the classical bits, Bob
can recover |ψ〉 by determining which state of the above
mixture his qubit is in. In a similar sense we can encrypt
and decrypt entanglement using classical keys.
Let us consider an MES
|E〉 = 1√
q
q−1∑
j=0
|aj〉|bj〉 (23)
in a bipartite system of two q-dimensional Hilbert spaces.
We can partially encrypt |E〉 by a unitary mapping
U l : |E〉 7→ |El〉 = 1√
q
q−1∑
j=0
ωjl|aj〉|bj〉 (24)
with
ωjl = exp
(
2iπjl
q
)
, l ∈ Zq, (25)
randomly chosen. Note that the phase information for
the encrypted state |El〉 is totally randomized for any
party without knowledge of the classical key l, and thus
the randomized state can be written in terms of separable
states as follows:
ρS =
q−1∑
l=0
∣∣El〉 〈El∣∣
=
1
q
q−1∑
j,j′=0
δ(j − j′)|aj〉〈aj′ | ⊗ |bj〉〈bj′ |
=
1
q
q−1∑
j=0
|aj〉〈aj | ⊗ |bj〉〈bj |. (26)
Hybrid ESSs can be implemented by the following pro-
cedure: Suppose that a dealer encodes an MES |S〉 into
the code space C = span{Cj}j=0···q−1 of a QECC and
thereby obtains
|Ψ〉 = 1√
q
q−1∑
j=0
|j〉|Cj〉. (27)
The access structure Q for the corresponding ESS is de-
termined by the code’s ability to recover from erasure er-
rors (for example an [[n, k, d]] stabilizer code corresponds
to an access structureQ consisting of any n−d+1 or more
shares). The dealer additionally performs the following
steps:
1. Performs U l on |Ψ〉 using a randomly chosen clas-
sical key l.
2. Encodes l in classical shares and distributes using a
classical secret sharing scheme with an access struc-
ture Q′ ⊆ Q.
We thus have a scheme with both classical and quantum
shares, which are separately distributed among the
n players. If a set of players is an element of Q′, it
can recover |S〉 with the classical key l. Otherwise
they are left in a separable state with a dealer be-
cause they cannot acquire any information about l.
We note that suitable classical secret sharing schemes
can be easily devised by using polynomial functions [1, 2].
IV. DESCRIBING PARTIAL INFORMATION IN
QRSS
As described earlier, we can consider both the “per-
fect” ESS where unauthorized sets are denied all entan-
glement and the “imperfect” case where this secrecy con-
dition is relaxed and some entanglement is leaked. A sim-
ilar framework applies to leaked information in imperfect
QSS, known as quantum ramp secret sharing (QRSS).
In QRSS, one considers three types of player structures:
access, forbidden and intermediate structures. The for-
bidden structure is the collection of unauthorized sets
that are completely denied any information about the
secret, and the intermediate structure is the collection of
unauthorized sets that obtain some information about a
secret.
As QRSS allows for smaller player shares than perfect
QSS, this information leakage could be an acceptable sac-
rifice, but, for a given secret sharing scenario, what con-
stitutes acceptable leakage likely depends on the nature
of the information that is accessible to the intermediate
subsets. One method to characterize information leakage
requires stabilizer encoding and therefore requires precise
details of encoding operation (e.g., stabilizers) to gener-
ate the information group [27] so is not of direct use here.
6Entanglement sharing gives us an alternative way to
characterise this information, which may be useful in
many circumstances. In a perfect ESS, we can simi-
larly consider three structures of players with respect to
correlations with the dealer, by dividing the adversary
structure into a forbidden structure and an intermediate
structure. Whereas all members of the adversary struc-
ture recover no entanglement with the dealer, we can
distinguish between forbidden subsets (who can recover
only product states with the dealer) and intermediate
subsets, who can recover non-product mixed states with
the dealer; i.e., they and the dealer can share classical
correlations (but no entanglement). Thus player subsets
can be divided into those recovering “quantum correla-
tions” (entanglement), classical correlations, or no corre-
lations with the dealer. This can be a useful qualitative
description of leaked information.
One can characterise the qualitative difference by con-
sidering, for example, a circuit implementing quantum
teleportation [8], which outputs a density matrix associ-
ated with an input state. Given an MES as a resource,
this circuit can be successfully operated and thus the out-
put density matrix is identical to the input state. How-
ever, if a product state is instead used as the resource, the
circuit outputs the identity matrix. If a separable state
is used as a resource, quantum teleportation cannot be
perfectly achieved but will output a density matrix with
some correlation with the input state.
For example, suppose that an arbitrary quantum state
|φS〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉 is the input state of the quantum
teleportation circuit, and a separable state
1
2
(
|0〉〈0| ⊗ |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |1〉〈1|
)
(28)
is used as its resource. Then the circuit outputs
ρR = |α|2|0〉〈0|+ |β|2|1〉〈1|. (29)
The output density matrix of this “classical teleporta-
tion” contains some information about the diagonal el-
ements of the density matrix ρS = |φS〉〈φS | but noth-
ing about its off-diagonal elements. In this context we
can characterize leaked information about the secret in a
QRSS scheme as “quantum” or “classical” in the sense of
requiring a quantum or only a classical channel to trans-
mit.
By considering QRSS schemes as ESSs (applying the
scheme to a secret of half of an MES, with the other
half retained by the dealer), we therefore have a means
of characterizing this information: a unauthorized sub-
set of players who can recover a partially-entangled state
with the dealer have some leaked quantum information,
whereas those recovering a separable state only have
leaked classical information. This method of classifying
information in the context of quantum teleportation pro-
vides one unambiguous definition of leakage of specifi-
cally quantum information, as it relies only on the clear
definitions of entangled and separable states. Since quan-
tum correlations are useful resources in many contexts,
a QRSS scheme may be acceptable if, for example, the
only information leaked is classical.
Now let us revisit the [[4, 2, 2]] stabilizer code. The
[[4, 2, 2]] stabilizer code is not only used to devise an ESS
but also for a (3, 2, 4) QRSS scheme [27] (where (3, 2, 4)
denotes a four-player scheme in which 3-player subsets
are authorized, whereas 3 − 2 = 1 player subsets receive
no information about the secret, and two-player subsets
receive partial information). Suppose that the ESS using
the [[4, 2, 2]] stabilizer code is applied to supply an MES
required for quantum teleportation. If an arbitrary quan-
tum state ρD is transmitted to four players, any three or
more players can receive the state perfectly with the re-
covered MES, and any single player can acquire no infor-
mation. However, any two players can have a separable
state with the dealer and learn the information about di-
agonal elements of ρD. Therefore, the [[4, 2, 2]] stabilizer
code yields a QRSS scheme that leaks only classical in-
formation to unauthorized sets, which corresponds to the
result of [27].
Formally, we propose a secrecy condition for QRSS in
terms of entanglement sharing as follows.
Definition 1. Given an encoding operation C : HD →
HP mapping
(1D ⊗ C) : |S〉 = 1√|C|∑
j
|j〉D|j〉D →
|Ψ〉 = 1√|C|∑
j
|j〉D|Cj〉P,
(30)
a QRSS scheme described by C is secure from the leakage
of quantum information if the reduced density matrix for
every intermediate set Γ ∈ P ,
ρΓ = trΓ¯(|Ψ〉〈Ψ|),
is separable with the system D for Γ¯ the complement of Γ.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced a new protocol for entanglement
sharing, which allows a dealer to distribute half of a MES
with a set of players in such a way that some collaborat-
ing groups of players can recover the entangled state fully,
but other groups cannot share any entanglement with the
dealer. While closely related to QSS (every perfect QSS
scheme will also be an entanglement sharing scheme) the
entanglement sharing conditions result in different prop-
erties for these schemes (for example share size of each
player need only be at least half the amount of initial
entanglement). We have demonstrated examples of con-
struction of entanglement sharing schemes from stabilizer
codes, both directly and through hybridization with clas-
sical encryption. We note that the general relationship
between QECCs and entanglement sharing (i.e., whether
or not schemes can be directly constructed from a given
7QECC) is still not evident, and therefore is a promising
avenue for further investigation.
Finally, we have shown that the entanglement shar-
ing paradigm provides a useful characterization of infor-
mation leakage in QRSS schemes, wherein any QECC
suitable for perfect entanglement sharing can be used to
construct a QRSS in which only classical information is
leaked to unauthorized player subsets. As with sharing
quantum secrets, entanglement sharing would be espe-
cially convenient if one could choose the access, interme-
diate, and adversary structure first and then find a corre-
sponding code, but in practice the codes are chosen first
and the structures are consequential. Given the many
contexts in which entanglement is a crucial resource for
performing quantum information protocols, this charac-
terization, and entanglement sharing schemes in general,
have the potential for a wide range of applications.
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Appendix: Investigation of Shor’s code
In this appendix, we supplement Sec. II C by investi-
gating other sets in {B}. As {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} is in a separa-
ble state with a dealer, {1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9} and {4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
are also separable with the dealer as shown by per-
mutation of the triplets. Similarly the complement of
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, namely {7, 8, 9}, is in a separable state
1
2
1∑
j=0
|j〉D〈j| ⊗ |Gj〉789〈Gj | (A.1)
and thus {1, 2, 3} and {4, 5, 6} are also separable with the
dealer. We regard these six subsets as a class of {1, 2, 3}.
Every set in {B} is classified into four classes: {1, 2, 3},
{1, 4, 7}, {1, 2, 3, 4} and {1, 4, 7, 8}. For each class, it
is enough to demonstrate whether or not the reduced
density matrices of a small subset (e.g., {1, 2, 3}) and a
big subset (e.g., {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}) are separable with the
dealer.
Let us look at the class of {1, 4, 7}. The complement
of {1, 4, 7} has a separable state written as
1
2
(
|+〉D〈+| ⊗ ρ235689 + |−〉D〈−| ⊗ ρ′235689
)
(A.2)
with
|±〉D := 1√
2
(|0〉D ± |1〉D),
ρ235689 =
1
4
(
|000000〉〈000000|+ |001111〉〈001111|
+ |110011〉〈110011|+ |111100〉〈111100|
)
,
ρ′235689 =
1
4
(
|000011〉〈000011|+ |001100〉〈001100|
+ |110000〉〈110000|+ |111111〉〈111111|
)
.
(A.3)
If we discard three more qubits {2, 5, 8} from the state
in Eq. (A.2), the resulting density matrix is a reduced
density matrix of {3, 6, 9} in this class and still has a
separable form with the dealer.
Next we consider the class of {1, 2, 3, 4}. The re-
duced density matrix for {5, 6, 7, 8, 9} (the complement
of {1, 2, 3, 4}) is given by
1
2
( 1∑
j=0
|j〉D〈j| ⊗ |Gj〉789〈Gj |
)
⊗ 1
2
(
|00〉56〈00|+ |11〉56〈11|
)
. (A.4)
In this case, the subset {5, 6} is independent of the other
qubits so the reduced density matrix for {6, 7, 8, 9} (a
small set in the class of {1, 2, 3, 4}) is separable with the
dealer after tracing out player 5.
Finally we consider the class of {1, 4, 7, 8}. By tracing
out {8} and {5, 8} from the state of Eq. (A.2), clearly
{2, 3, 5, 6, 9} and {2, 3, 6, 9} in this class are separable
with the dealer. We therefore conclude that any subset
of players in {B} is in a separable state with the dealer.
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